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A Place of Their Own: Crowds in the New
Market for Equity Crowdfunding
Seth C. Oranburg†
Crowdsourcing’s limits are determined by people’s passion
and imagination, which is to say, there aren’t any limits at all.
– Jeff Howe
INTRODUCTION
Is small better than large? When it comes to normative
business law policy, many seem to think so. Many scholars
attribute the 2007–08 financial crisis to mis-regulation of large
banks. Many others attribute the subsequent economic
recovery to jobs created by small businesses. While the “99%”
protested big banks on Wall Street, the “Startup America”
grassroots campaign for small business garnered political
support for corporate-finance legislation. Within a two-year
period, Congress passed the JOBS Act1—which tripled private
company shareholder limits,2 authorized federal equity
crowdfunding,3 and created the “mini-IPO” Regulation A+4—
and the Dodd-Frank Act5—which seeks to end “too big to fail”
by imposing a multitude of requirements on large firms.6 In
other words, policymakers seem to be trying to encourage the
smallest firms while discouraging the biggest ones. But this
policy decision seems to ignore the fact that all large firms were
† Assistant Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law.
Copyright © 2016 by Seth C. Oranburg.
1. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat.
306 (2011) [hereinafter “JOBS Act”]; Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388 (Nov.
16, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269, and
274).
2. JOBS Act, Title II.
3. JOBS Act, Title III.
4. JOBS Act, Title IV.
5. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (Dodd Frank Act was enacted after being
signed by the President on July 21, 2010).
6. Id.
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once startups that have elected to “go public” because they
determined that the benefits of being public outweighed the
costs of public-company regulations. The nature of corporate
and securities regulation forces startups to stay small and
private in order to avoid onerous public-company regulations,
which actually limits the government’s ability to protect
investors.
I call this contradictory policy phenomenon “Too Small To
Succeed.” In future work, I will develop a unified theory of “Too
Small To Succeed” regulations—which are reflected in many
private-law regulations that have accrued since the recent
financial crises—and analyze their unintended consequences.
But, for the instant purposes of this Essay, I will restrict this
exploration insofar as it pertains to the regulation of online
equity crowdfunding, whereby ordinary Americans will be able
to invest in startups that are not yet publicly traded.7 The law
is intended to encourage the development of startups and to
allow more Americans to profit from investing in them. But this
rosy picture may not come to pass because too many of the
traditional investor-protection provisions, that are popular with
the too-big-to-fail policymakers, ultimately made their way into
the federal crowdfunding law. As a result, a rapid rise of the
Digital Shareholder is unlikely. Instead, a more likely outcome
is that startups and investors will quickly realize that federal
crowdfunding in its present form is too small to succeed.
This Essay will discuss how one specific instance of the
“Too Small To Succeed” phenomenon resulted in policies that
may impede or inhibit equity crowdfunding. The investors in
online equity crowdfunding—who Professor Andrew Schwartz
terms “Digital Shareholders”8—must create large networks in
order to operate efficiently. Policies must leverage the unique
characteristics of these Digital Shareholders; otherwise, as
Professor Darian Ibrahim argues, equity crowdfunding may
devolve into a “Market for Lemons.”9
I. DIGITAL SHAREHOLDERS
Professors

Ibrahim and

Schwartz both

begin

their

7. JOBS Act, Title III.
8. Andrew A. Schwartz, The Digital Shareholder, 100 MINN. L. REV. 609,
679 (2016).
9. Darian M. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for Lemons?, 100
MINN. L. REV. 561 (2016).
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inquiries on the vitality of federal crowdfunding with a
discussion of the well-recognized “trio of problems” in
entrepreneurial finance as developed by Professor Ronald
Gilson and others.10 In short, startup investors have three
economic problems, which professional and public-company
investors can generally mitigate, but Digital Shareholders
might not be able to avoid. First, there is an information
asymmetry problem: entrepreneurs know more than investors
about what entrepreneurs will do,11 which is why professional
investors join the board and oversee the entrepreneurs.12
Second, there is great uncertainty as to whether the venture
will succeed,13 so professional investors invest in stages, over
time.14 Third, there are agency costs (specifically, residual
loss);15 entrepreneurs have incentives to shirk and self-deal,16
especially when the investor does not understand the
entrepreneurs’ technology,17 so professionals generally invest in
familiar technical areas.18 These problems and their solutions
10. Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from
the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1076 (2003); see Robert P.
Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the
Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 41 n.9 (2006) (“This model . . . can be found
in virtually any academic discussion . . . .”).
11. See, e.g., Adrian Chiang, How Entrepreneurs Can Crowdfund
Renewable Energy Projects, 8 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 659, 683
(2015).
12. NOAM WASSERMAN, THE FOUNDER’S DILEMMAS: ANTICIPATING AND
AVOIDING THE PITFALLS THAT CAN SINK A STARTUP 145 (2012).
13. See Chiang, supra note 11, at 683.
14. WASSERMAN, supra note 12, at 145; Startup Financing, in STARTUP
CREATION FOR THE SMART ECO-EFFICIENT BUILT ENVIRONMENT (F. Pacheco
Torgal ed., 2016).
15. Residual losses are agency costs resulting from divergent interests
of principals and agents that persist even when principals expend
effort to monitor and bond the agent. See Jay B. Kesten, Managerial
Entrenchment and Shareholder Wealth Revisited: Theory and Evidence from a
Recessionary Financial Market, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1609 (2010).
16. See Agency Costs, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/a/agencycosts.asp (last visited Aug. 13, 2016).
17. American Experience: Henry Ford (PBS television broadcast Jan.
29, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/transcript/
henryford-transcript/ (“His investors want to make an expensive car to sell to
wealthy people. Ford disagrees fundamentally. He wants to create a car for
the people. . . . He’s trying to perfect an invention. In order to keep doing the
trial runs and get it better, it’s going to take a lot of capital to keep testing,
keep testing. . . . Narrator: Finally realizing they were being duped, his
backers pulled the plug.”).
18. Venture Capital, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., http://www.sba.gov/
content/venture-capital (last visited Aug. 13, 2016).
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are interrelated (e.g., staged financing addresses both
uncertainty and shirking), and these strategies have been
formalized in the standard forms for venture capital
financing.19
The Digital Shareholder probably cannot mitigate the trio
of problems in the traditional ways. Given a legal limit of
$10,000 per investor per year, it is doubtful that the digital
shareholder will have the time, inclination, or ability to join
two or three corporate boards, manage a multi-staged privateinvestment portfolio, and get technical expertise in the latest
app-coding languages.
In addition, crowdfunding theoretically has the additional
problem of competition with professional investment.20 The
most promising startups receive multiple offers from the most
prominent venture-capital investors, who contribute not only
money but also professional services, work space, mentorship,
advice, management, and, of course, access to yet more money.
Offline, nodes of well-connected venture capitalists (VCs) with
MBAs from Stanford share information about leads over lattes
in Palo Alto. They meet founders daily, and their financial
resources are virtually unlimited. Their associates process data
from expensive, manicured databases21 into custom analytics
reports, fine-tuned to each principal’s predilections.22 The
Digital Shareholder, on the other hand, goes to
Crowdfunder.com
and
clicks
“Search.”
Can
Digital
Shareholders—who are by definition amateurs—compete with
investment professionals in finding, acquiring, servicing, and
monitoring the best investment opportunities?
This picture may seem pretty bleak, but Professor
Schwartz identifies five novel solutions that the Digital
Shareholder may employ to solve the trio of problems: (1) the
wisdom of the crowd,23 (2) the crowdsourcing of information,24
19. NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, MODEL LEGAL DOCUMENTS, http://
nvca.org/resources/model-legal-documents/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2016).
20. In other work I have explained how crowdfunding and venture capital
could be engineered to work in tandem. See Seth C. Oranburg, Bridgefunding:
Crowdfunding and the Market for Entrepreneurial Finance, 25 CORNELL J. L.
& PUB. POL’Y 397 (2015).
21. Some of the research tools that professional investors use include
PitchBook, CapitalIQ, Option Impact, and SharkRepellant.
22. ASKIVY, Role Descriptions in Venture Capital (VC), http://www.askivy
.net/articles/venture-capital/venture-capital-explained/role-descriptions-inventure-capital (last visited Aug. 13, 2016).
23. Schwartz, supra note 8, Part IV.A.
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(3) online reputation,25 (4) securities-based compensation,26 and
(5) digital monitoring.27 These Digital Shareholder strategies
may come into play both during the campaign and after the
company receives the money.
While Professor Schwartz’s solutions are theoretically
sound, there is a practical problem to their implementation: all
of these solutions require operations on a large scale, and the
federal law is specifically designed to limit federal
crowdfunding to a small scale. Therefore, without modification
to the federal law, Professor Schwartz’s solutions cannot be
effectively used by the Digital Shareholder. Additionally, some
of the heuristic behaviors that Digital Shareholders may use to
make investment decisions may be problematic themselves.
A. THE WISDOM OF CROWDFUNDING
Professor Schwartz rightly points out that “[a] wellestablished body of scientific literature shows that groups are
better at finding facts and making predictions than lone
individuals, even experts.”28 But the wisdom of crowds is only
expressed where crowds can grow sufficiently large,29 evaluate
information that can be perfectly known,30 or are organized
around a thought leader.31 Currently, our securities laws seem
to preclude these features, making it difficult for crowdfunding
to converge on wise decisions. Instead, our securities laws seem
more likely to encourage herding behavior, which is the key
inefficiency that arises within crowds.32
24. Id. at Part IV.B.
25. Id. at Part IV.C.
26. Id. at Part IV.D.
27. Id. at Part IV.E.
28. Id. at 659 (citing JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: HOW
THE MANY ARE SMARTER THAN THE FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM
SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES AND NATIONS 31 (2004)) (“[A] large
group of diverse individuals will come up with better and more robust
forecasts and make more intelligent decisions than even the most skilled
[individual acting alone].”); Karsten Hueffer et al., The Wisdom of Crowds:
Predicting a Weather and Climate-Related Event, 8 JUDGMENT & DECISION
MAKING 91, 91 (Mar. 2013). For crowdfunding, where investors will have to
gauge the future performance of various startup companies, predictions will be
more important than fact-finding.
29. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 659.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Ilan Lobel & Evan Sadler, Information Diffusion in Networks through
Social Learning, 10 THEORETICAL ECON. 807, 808 (2015) (“According to the
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Crowd Science, also known as “Citizen Science,” explains
that groups of people (such as Digital Shareholders in
crowdfunding) convey information to each other through their
behaviors.33 This is the colloquially called “wisdom of the
crowd.” When one member of a group witnesses the behavior of
another, the first member may assume the second member is
acting on information that is private to that second member.
The first member, who may also have some private
information, may infer the second member’s private
information from the action that is observed. The first actor
may then take a similar action based both on private
information and inferred information.
A familiar example makes this theory clear. When a person
decides to watch a video on a web site like YouTube, that
person can see how many others have watched that video,
which suggests something about the quality of that video. That
person may decide to watch the most-watched video because
the group information suggests that video is the highest
quality.34
This may seem quite innocuous, but as the crowd gets
larger, the information from crowd behavior begins to
overwhelm the actor’s private information. The extreme form of
this group-think behavior is called an “information cascade,”
where even rational individuals will choose to abandon their
private information (or not make efforts to gather private
information in the first place) and instead to follow the crowd.35
In this case, the wisdom of the crowd can be sublimated into
herd behavior.
Crowd science theory deems a crowd “successful” when it
“aggregates” “asymptotic information.” In other words, from a
systems-sciences perspective, a “wise” crowd is one that
efficiently produces and distributes unique information about
the true state of the world.

last two decades of economics scholarship, herding is the key inefficiency that
arises in social learning models.”).
33. Eric Hand, Citizen Science: People Power, 466 NATURE 685, 685–87
(2010).
34. R. Crane and D. Sornette, Viral, Quality, and Junk Videos on
YouTube: Separating Content From Noise in an Information Rich
Environment, AAAI (2008), https://www.aaai.org/Papers/Symposia/Spring/
2008/SS-08-06/SS08-06-004.pdf.
35. DAVID EASLEY & JON KLEINBERG, NETWORKS, CROWDS, AND
MARKETS: REASONING ABOUT A HIGHLY CONNECTED WORLD 6 (2010).
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Crowd science literature offers empirical findings about the
wisdom of crowds. Data shows that the wisdom of crowds
converges on an accurate decision as the size of the crowd
becomes arbitrarily large.36 In other words, larger networks
make better decisions. Unfortunately for equity crowdfunding,
the initial network size is zero, and government regulations
will likely keep federal equity crowdfunding small.37
In crowd-science talk, individual beliefs are “bounded”
when no one individual has certainty as to the right answer,
and they are “unbounded” when some members have absolute
certainty about the true state of the world. Of course, few
things we might want to ask of crowds are as binary and
obviously knowable as 0 or 1. Infinitely unbounded beliefs are
an assumption some crowd scientists make, but no human
opinion is ever truly knowable and correct in an absolute sense.
Knowledge of which crowdfunding company is worth
investing in cannot be absolutely certain, so assuming bounded
beliefs seem to better reflect the reality of crowdfunding.
When beliefs are bounded, there may be a problem called
“herding” or “information cascades.” Herding is when
individuals merely mimic others’ actions, ignoring their own
private information, as opposed to “learning aggregation,” when
the crowd converges on the right result by leveraging both
public and private information.38
More recent studies have determined that social networks
within crowds can improve information aggregation and lead to
asymptotic learning where there are “influential agents” or
“information leaders,” so long as that agent is not excessively
influential.39 In other words, when there is an individual amid
the crowd who is observed by most or all other members of the

36. Daron Acemoglu et al., Bayesian Learning in Social Networks, 78 REV.
ECON. STUDS. 1201, 1203 (2011) (“We say that there is asymptotic learning
[information aggregation] if as the size of the society becomes arbitrarily large,
equilibrium actions converge (in probability) to the action that yields the
higher pay-off.”).
37. Seth C. Oranburg, Democratizing Startups, 68 RUTGERS U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016).
38. Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and
Cultural Change as Information Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992 (1992);
Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q. J. ECON. 797
(1992). See also Lones Smith & Peter Sørensen, Pathological Outcomes of
Observational Learning, 68 ECONOMETRICA 371 (2000).
39. Acemoglu, supra note 36, at 1218–19; Lobel & Sadler, supra note 32,
at 809.
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crowd as a thought leader, even a relatively small crowd with
bounded beliefs may exhibit the wisdom of the crowd.
To summarize this in simpler terms, crowdfunding
networks seem to have the qualities—namely, small size and
bounded beliefs—that encourage herding behavior, which is
inefficient and undesirable. Government policies that keep
crowd size small are likely to further prevent the wisdom of the
crowd from discovering the true state of the world (i.e., which
investments are good and which are bad).
To alleviate this problem, regulations could allow or even
encourage crowdfunding networks to grow large. An alternative
solution, which I have expressly proposed in prior work40 and
which Professor Ibrahim alludes to in A Market for Lemons,41 is
to require crowdfunding companies to have an influential
agent. These modifications to the law will help the Digital
Shareholder benefit from the wisdom of the crowd.
B. CROWDSOURCING
Crowdsourcing—where a group or “crowd” of users
collaborate to produce information that is beneficial to the
whole community42—is a more promising ability of the Digital
Shareholder because, and Professor Schwartz points out, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has expressly
endorsed the sharing of information about investment
opportunities among Digital Shareholders.43 But the SEC’s
endorsement of crowdsourcing44 is mere verbiage unless the
information networks are structured in a way that facilitates
information diffusion without causing undesirable information
cascades.

40. Oranburg, supra note 37.
41. Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 600.
42. Anhai Doan, Raghu Ramakrishnan, & Alon Y. HaLevy,
Crowdsourcing Systems on the World-Wide Web, 54 COMMC’NS OF THE ACM 86
(Apr. 2011).
43. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 663.
44. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239–40, 249) (“Individuals interested in the
crowdfunding campaign—members of the ‘crowd’—may share information
about the project, cause, idea or business with each other and use the
information to decide whether or not to fund the campaign based on the
collective ‘wisdom of the crowd,’”); id. at 71,547 (Crowdfunding portals may
“[p]rovide communication channels by which investors can communicate with
one another and with representatives of the issuer through the funding
portal’s platform about offerings through the platform . . .”).
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Professors Lobel and Sadler introduced the metric of
“diffusion” to the literature on theoretical economics.45
Previously, social networks were deemed successful when they
produced “aggregation,” which is when the true state of the
world is revealed across a whole population.46 Complete
aggregation does not generally occur in the real world;47
theories that predict complete aggregation rely on unrealistic
assumptions of perfect network topology48 or signals of
unbounded strength.49 On the other hand, diffusion—which is
when all members of society obtain information such that they
are able to achieve the same ex ante probability of making a
good decision as an expert—can be used to evaluate the success
of networks where strong signal are rare but informative.50
Applying the theory of diffusion to the SEC’s
crowdsourcing mandate (as codified in the C.F.R.)51 reveals
some theoretical concerns about its system design and suggests
that additional empirical research is needed. The SEC’s system
design calls for Digital Shareholders to share information with
each other. Professor Schwartz deals handily with the
preliminary concerns that shareholders will guard and not
share their private information: no one shareholder can fund a
company and so a shareholder who wants a company to succeed
must inform others about its value; in short, “crowdfunding
promotes cooperation.”52
But what is the nature of the information that is
communicated? The shareholders generating this information
are legally permitted to invest somewhere between $2500 and
$5000 per year in all their crowdfunding investments.53 Ideally,
Digital Shareholders diversify this investment in at least ten to
twenty separate companies.54 If a shareholder invests only
45. Lobel & Sadler, supra note 32, at 811.
46. EASLEY & KLEINBERG, supra note 35, at 6 (“What we see in these
figures is a growing awareness and adoption of a new innovation that is visible
in aggregate, across a whole population.”).
47. But see Exodus 19:11 (“And be ready against the third day: for the
third day the LORD will come down in the sight of all the people upon mount
Sinai.”).
48. Acemoglu, supra note 36, at 1201.
49. Smith & Sørensen, supra note 38, at 371.
50. Lobel & Sadler, supra note 32, at 807, 809.
51. 17 C.F.R. Parts 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 269, and 274 (2016).
52. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 666.
53. Id.
54. Oranburg, supra note 20; Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s Dirty

156

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES [100:147

about $250 per company, that shareholder is rationally
motivated to spend no more than $250 in effort to research,
select, and transmit information about that investment
opportunity. To put this number in perspective, a stock-market
analyst who works for an exchange earns about $115,000 per
year55 and covers about 30 companies,56 which equates to about
$4000 per company covered. Additionally, a professional
analyst is generally better trained in analyzing equities than
an average person who may participate in crowdfunding.
Accordingly, the signals from shareholders are likely to be
weak and frequent. Recall that diffusion is most likely to occur
when signals are strong and infrequent. In the absence of
aggregation or diffusion, information cascades are likely to
occur.57
Professor Schwartz recognizes that “[a]nchoring and
information cascades like this could undermine the
effectiveness of crowdsourcing investor information,” although
he concludes that “there is good reason to think that anchoring
and information cascades will not be fatal in the context of
crowdfunding because investors are likely to feel and act
independent from one another.”58 I tend to disagree with this
conclusion because shareholders who are investing only about
$250 per company have no rational reason to expend the effort
required to think independently and instead will employ
groupthink heuristics to make investment decisions; however,
the behavior of crowdfunding investors remains an unsolved
empirical question that requires further study. Additionally, as
Professor Schwartz points out, there may be non-pecuniary

Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3395–96 (2013).
55. Louis Horkan, The Salary of a Stock Market Analyst, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE: WORK, http://work.chron.com/salary-stock-market-analyst-8556
.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2016).
56. THE VAULT MBA CAREER BIBLE 162 (2005).
57. Acemoglu, supra note 36, at 1203 (“The main result of Smith and
Sorensen is that when each individual observes all past actions and private
beliefs are unbounded, information will be aggregated and the correct action
will be chosen asymptotically. In contrast, the results in Bikhchandani,
Hirshleifer and Welch (1992), Banerjee (1992), and Smith and Sorensen (2000)
indicate that with bounded beliefs, there will not be asymptotic learning (or
information aggregation). Instead, as emphasized by Bikhchandani,
Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) and Banerjee (1992), there will be ‘herding’ or
‘informational cascades,’ where individuals copy past actions and/or
completely ignore their own signals.”).
58. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 668–69.
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motivates, such as generating a positive online reputation, that
may overcome the rational apathy of Digital Shareholders.
C. NON-PECUNIARY MOTIVATIONS
Professor Schwartz comprehensively addresses the role of
online reputation in promoting information sharing in
crowdfunding networks.59 Additionally, gamification—the use
of game design elements in non-game contexts60—is an
additional non-pecuniary motivation that may encourage
Digital Shareholders to share information. Gamification
methods create a positive user experience that improves user
retention and utilization.61 Recent studies have shown that
gamification works for implantations in commerce,62 sharing,63
innovation,64 ideation,65 data gathering,66 and other contexts
related to equity crowdfunding.
Gamification can facilitate online reputation by “scoring”
the reputation of users; in fact, there are business-method
patents to this effect.67 Gamification of reputation has been
59. Id. at Part IV.C.
60. Sebastian Deterding et al., From Game Design Elements to
Gamefulness: Defining “Gamification,” in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 15TH INT’L
ACAD. MINDTREK CONF.: ENVISIONING FUTURE MEDIA ENV’TS 9 (2011),
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2181040.
61. Sebastian Deterding et al., Gamification: Using Game-Design
Elements in Non-Gaming Contexts, in CHI ’11 EXTENDED ABSTRACTS ON
HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYS. 2425 (2011), http://dl.acm.org/citation
.cfm?id=1979575.
62. Juho Hamari, Transforming Homo Economicus into Homo Ludens: A
Field Experiment on Gamification in a Utilitarian Peer-To-Peer Trading
Service, 12 ELEC. COM. RES. APPLICATIONS 236 (2013).
63. Markus Montola et al., Applying Game Achievement Systems to
Enhance User Experience in a Photo Sharing Service, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
13TH INT’L ACAD. MINDTREK CONF.: EVERYDAY LIFE IN THE UBIQUITOUS ERA
94 (2009), http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1621859.94-97.
64. J.H. Jung, Christopher Schneider & Joseph Valacich, Enhancing the
Motivational Affordance of Information Systems: The Effects of Real-time
Performance Feedback and Goal Setting in Group Collaboration
Environments, 56 MGMT SCI. 724 (2010).
65. Maximilian Witt, Christian Scheiner & Susanne Robra-Bissantz,
Gamification of Online Idea Competitions: Insights from an Explorative Case,
41 Jahrestagung der Gesellschaft für Informatik (October 4–7, 2011).
66. Theo Downes-Le Guin et al., Myths and Realities of Respondent
Engagement in Online Surveys, 54 INT’L J. MKT. RES. 1 (2012).
67. Method and System for Managing Domain Specific and Viewer
Specific Reputation on Online Communities, U.S. Patent No. 20080109245 A1
(filed Nov. 3, 2007) (issued May 8, 2008), https://www.google.com/patents/
US20080109245.
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applied in varied contexts such as encouraging software
developers to include comments in their code68 and creating
leaderboards to encourage classroom learning.69 Gamification
has even been used to attract and retain reliable crowdsourcing
tasks such as relevance assessment and clustering, which could
be directly applied to crowdsourcing for the Digital
Shareholder.70
In sum, while the SEC does not mandate crowdsourcing, it
also does not prevent it. So long as there is sufficient
competition in the market for crowdfunding portals, some
enterprising portals may employ gamification to encourage
Digital Shareholders to contribute high-quality efforts to
investment crowdsourcing, which may indeed help Digital
Shareholders overcome information asymmetry and agency
costs in crowdfunding.
D. INCENTIVES AND MANAGEMENT
The Digital Shareholder has two additional devices that
may help crowdfunding succeed. First, Professor Schwartz
suggests that an entrepreneur who uses crowdfunding should
promise to “eat its own cooking” by being compensated with the
same type of security that Digital Shareholders receive.71
Second, digital monitoring—allowing investors to oversee
entrepreneurs through an “online chat group” and similar
means—could also be used to ensure that entrepreneurs do not
shirk.
The SEC does not require this. Whether or not
entrepreneurs, Digital Shareholders, and the other participants
in the equity-investment ecosystem (venture capitalists and
angel investors) will prefer this arrangement is essentially an
empirical question that has not been answered. Until the data
show these requirements are helpful or necessary as default
68. Christian Reinhard Prause, Improving the Internal Quality of
Software through Reputation-based Gamification, (Mar. 21, 2013)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Aachen University), http://citeseerx.ist.psu
.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.465.7157&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
69. Ilaria Caponetto, Jeffrey Earp & Michela Ott, Gamification and
Education: A Literature Review, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 8TH EUR. CONF. ON
GAMES-BASED LEARNING 50 (2014).
70. Carsten Eickhoff et al., Quality through Flow and Immersion:
Gamifying Crowdsourced Relevance Assessments, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
35TH INT’L ACM SIGIR CONF. ON RES. AND DEV. IN INFO. RETRIEVAL 871,
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2348400.
71. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 679.
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provisions, it is not prudent to mandate these arrangements in
all sales of crowdfunding stock.
On the other hand, creating a new role for an overseer and
evaluator of crowdfunding investments—an idea which I
develop more fully in Democratizing Startups72 and to which
Professor Ibrahim also alludes to in A Market for Lemons73—
solves many of the information-asymmetry and agency-cost
problems in crowdfunding while providing precisely the type of
strong information signal that has been theoretically and
empirically proven in the crowd science literature to improve
crowdsourcing outcomes.
II. THE EQUITY CROWDFUNDING MARKET
While the federal law that enables equity crowdfunding
was passed on April 5, 2012,74 that law simply required the
SEC to promulgate final rules that allow equity crowdfunding
to occur.75 The SEC’s final rules just went into effect on May
16, 2016.76 There is still very little data on how this brand-new
exemption is functioning, but an analysis of the non-equity
crowdfunding campaigns that succeeded previously and an
examination of the equity crowdfunding campaigns that have
already launched provides several valuable insights into the
new equity crowdfunding market.
First, comparing the top 10 crowdfunded campaigns with
the top 10 venture-backed companies reveals that these
different modalities of fundraising are used for very different
purposes. A list of the most successful crowdfunding campaigns
(as measured by amount raised) consists almost entirely of
consumer-technology products (e.g., the Pebble smartwatch, the
Coolest cooler, the World’s Best Travel Jacket, the Pono Music
Player, the Sondors Electric Bike) and entertainment (e.g., the
Exploding Kittens video game, the Veronica Mars Movie
Project, Reading Rainbow, the Super Troopers 2 movie).77 In
72. Oranburg, supra note 37 (proposing a “private independent analyst” or
PIA).
73. Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 600 (proposing a “Nominated Advisor” or
NOMAD).
74. 17 C.F.R. Parts 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269, and 274 (2016).
75. Id.
76. Catherine Clifford, Starting May 16, Entrepreneurs Can Raise Money
in a Whole New Way. Here’s What You Need to Know, ENTREPRENEUR (May 5,
2016), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/275215.
77. Most Successful Crowdfunding Campaigns, CROWDFUNDING BLOG
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stark contrast, the Wall Street Journal’s second annual
ranking of the top venture-capital-backed companies shows
that “investors are chasing after Internet firms.”78 Digital
Shareholders almost never invest in business-to-business (B2B)
solutions, which is one of the top investment categories for VCs.
In fact, “[t]he top three [VC-funded] companies are all businessproduct makers: Genband Inc., a supplier of voice-overInternet-protocol technology to telecom companies; Xirrus Inc.,
a provider of wireless networking equipment; and Tabula Inc.,
which makes semiconductors for electronic products.”79 It is
readily apparent that a battery-powered cooler with a built-in
radio (the aforementioned crowdfunded Cooler Cooler) is an
entirely different sort of project than supplying B2B VoIP
services.
Second, the success rate of crowdfunding projects (as
measured by their ability to raise funds) is much higher than
the success rate of companies seeking VC funding. Crowds have
already shown a strong preference for funding companies that
are required to return all the funds if the companies do not
meet an overall fundraising goal by raising money from a large
number of people, whereas venture-capital firms generally
invest solo or in small groups simultaneously. On Kickstarter,
arguably the most popular non-equity crowdfunding platform
with over $2 billion pledged to projects,80 companies must reach
a pre-established fundraising goal before any money is released
to the company.81 Even so, an incredible 44% of Kickstarter
(Feb. 18, 2016), http://crowdfundingblog.com/most-successful-crowdfundingprojects/.
78. Colleen Debaise & Scott Austin, The Top 50 Venture-Backed
Companies, WALL ST J. (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052748703300904576178673309577828.
79. Zoran Basich & Emily Maltby, Looking for the ‘Next Big Thing’?
Ranking the Top 50 Startups, WALL ST J. (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10000872396390444813104578018940187057924.
80. Stats,
KICKSTARTER,
https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats?ref=
footer (last visited Aug. 13, 2016) (showing that through Kickstarter’s
platform, over $2 billion has been pledged to various projects).
81. Funding, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/handbook/
funding (last visited Aug. 13, 2016) (explaining that Kickstarter will not
release any money until the project’s goal has been reached); How Likely Is
Your Crowdfunded Campaign to Succeed?, CAN. MEDIA FUND, http://
crowdfunding.cmf-fmc.ca/facts_and_stats/how-likely-is-your-crowdfundingcampaign-to-succeed (last visited Aug. 13, 2016) (“Kickstarter campaigns, on
the other hand, must reach their goal to receive any funds. This threshold
requirement may also influence owners of Kickstarter campaigns to work
harder to reach their objectives, or to set lower goals, as they will not receive
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projects met their funding goal in 2013.82 Comparatively, only
about 1.5% of venture-capital funding goes to seed-stage
startups.83 While there is not any data directly showing how
many companies looked for VC financing and failed to receive
it, some commentators have calculated that about “99.93% of
[startup companies] will never get VC.”84
Additionally, there is a troubling gender gap in VC
investment that is actually reversed within the crowdfunding
context. Despite the fact that 36.3% of businesses in the United
States are owned by women,85 women-led companies received
only 7% of all the venture capital funding in the United
States.86 In an empirical test, men who pitched to VCs received
funding 60% more often than women did.87 In another
experiment that offered investors the same pitch with a man’s
voice and with a woman’s voice, 68% of investors preferred to
fund the venture pitched by a man’s voice.88 In stark contrast,
70% of women-led startups on the CircleUp Portal received
funding, where only 58% of men-led startups received capital.89
Crowdfunding thereby demonstrates its potential to
“democratize startups.”90
any funding unless they are ‘completely’ successful.”).
82. Robert Strohmeyer, The Crowdfunding Caveat: Most Campaigns Fail,
PC WORLD (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2049399/thecrowdfunding-caveat-most-campaigns-fail.html. For up-to-date, daily updated
statistics, see also Stats, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats
(last visited Aug. 13, 2016).
83. 2014 MoneyTree Report, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (Feb. 2016),
https://www.pwcmoneytree.com/Reports/FullArchive/National_2014-4.pdf
(showing that $719 million out of $48.349 billion venture-capital funding goes
to seed-stage startups).
84. Dileep Rao, Why 99.5% of Entrepreneurs Should Stop Wasting Time
Seeking Venture Capital, FORBES (July 22, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
dileeprao/2013/07/22/why-99-95-of-entrepreneurs-should-stop-wasting-timeseeking-venture-capital/#12e54458296d (“[T]he probability of an average new
business getting VC is about 0.0005 (300/600,000).”).
85. Fact Sheet: Women-Owned Businesses, NAT’L WOMEN’S BUS. COUNCIL
(2012), https://www.nwbc.gov/sites/default/files/FS_Women-Owned_Businesses
.pdf.
86. Shaunacy Ferro, Your Startup is More Likely to Get Funding if You
Are a Man, FASTCO DESIGN (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.fastcodesign.com/
3027458/your-startup-is-more-likely-to-get-funding-if-youre-a-man.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Susan Caminiti, Women Rule When It Comes to Crowdfunding, CNBC
(Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/09/03/women-rule-when-it-comes-tocrowdfunding.html.
90. See Oranburg, supra note 37.
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Third, the failure rate of crowdfunded companies (as
measured by their ability to deliver products as promised), is
also much lower than the failure rate of venture-backed
companies (as measured by their ability to return their
investors’ capital). According to recent reports, “three-quarters
of venture-backed firms in the U.S. don’t return investors’
capital.”91 The failure rate among angel-funded companies
seems to be even higher: out of 100 average angel-funded
companies, “two will eventually return just the capital that was
originally invested, leaving only three as profitable exits.”92
Meanwhile, Kickstarter reports that only 9% of successfully
funded projects fail to deliver rewards to their backers.93 Other
independent sources have put the overall crowdfunding failureto-timely-deliver rate at a much-higher 39%.94 In any event, the
failure rate of crowdfunding projects to deliver on promises is
remarkably lower than the failure rate of VC-funded companies
to make a return on investment.
It bears repeating that the data above regards non-equity
crowdfunding. It is critical to re-evaluate these empirical
studies when data on equity crowdfunding is available. Still, it
is sensible to hypothesize that many of these above-mentioned
non-equity crowdfunding trends will also be found in equity
crowdfunding because these two fundraising modalities share
so many observable characteristics. In any event, it is sufficient
for the instant purposes of this Essay to demonstrate that
crowdfunding and venture-capital investment are quite
different, and therefore might be best understood as occurring
in completely separate marketplaces.

91. Deborah Gage, The Venture Capital Secret: 3 out of 4 Startups
Fail, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10000872396390443720204578004980476429190;
see
also
John
McDermott, Report: 75% of Venture-Backed Start-Ups Fail, INC. (Sept. 20,
2012), http://www.inc.com/john-mcdermott/report-3-out-of-4-venture-backedstart-ups-fail.html.
92. David S. Rose, The Startup Failure Rate Among Angel-Funded
Companies, GUST BLOG (Aug. 17, 2015), http://blog.gust.com/the-startupfailure-rate-among-angel-funded-companies/.
93. Luke Graham, Just 9% of Successfully Funded Kickstarter Projects
Fail to Deliver, CNBC (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/10/9percent-kickstarter-projects-fail-to-deliver.html; see also The Kickstarter
Fulfillment Report, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/fulfillment
(last visited Aug. 13, 2016).
94. Strohmeyer, supra note 82 (“The first backers to receive their packs
waited two months past the initial delivery estimate, while 39 percent are still
waiting.”).
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A. DUMB MONEY, WISE CROWDS
None of the crowd-science theory of information
aggregation and diffusion matters if there are no good
investments available through crowdfunding. Professor
Ibrahim argues that equity crowdfunding has a “market for
lemons” problem.95 The classic example of a lemons market is
the 1970s used car lot downtown. Buyers assume those cars are
low quality, so the seller discounts them. But one cannot sell
high quality products at discount prices, so the high-quality
products exit the market, and only the “lemons” are left.
Professor Ibrahim argues that dumb money may turn
crowdfunding into a market for lemons. In response to
Professor Ibrahim’s argument that crowdfunding is “dumb
money,” see Part II of this Essay; see also Section (A)(2)(b)(ii) of
his Article, which also acknowledges that crowds can be wise.
But crowds are not necessarily wise, especially where
regulations are imposed on them in ways that prevents
networks from aggregating and disseminating information
efficiently.
Professor Ibrahim’s point that dumb money can ruin
valuations in a shallow market should be taken quite seriously.
As discussed above, policymakers appear not to fully
understand the nature of crowds in terms of the systems and
structures that best evidence their wisdom. If crowds cannot
aggregate and diffuse valuable information about the true
value of the companies who seek crowdfunding investments,
then crowdfunding may fail. Therefore, policymakers should
focus on making “smart regulations” that leverage the wisdom
of crowds to prevent the “dumb money” problem.
B. A DISTINCT MARKET FOR CROWDFUNDING
Even if crowds are “dumb,” there are still reasons to
believe the crowdfunding will not be a market for lemons,
mainly because the crowdfunding market is in fact a different
market that other investment markets. Professor Ibrahim’s
core argument is that owners of good companies will not offer
investment opportunities in such companies to Digital
Shareholders because these “dumb money” investors will not be
able to distinguish between good and bad companies. Digital
Shareholders will not value good companies more than bad

95. Ibrahim, supra note 82, at 593.
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companies, so owners of good companies will only seek capital
form professional investors, who can appreciate their quality
and will pay for it. Critically, this argument rests on the
assumption that the properties which make a company “good”
or “bad” are the same for Digital Shareholders and professional
investors. But this is not the case. Crowdfunding is
economically valuable precisely because it makes funding
available to an entirely new genre of companies; namely, the
companies that professional investors have long eschewed.
In George Akerlof’s classic example of the lemons market
for used automobiles, there are just four kinds of cars: new,
good cars; new, bad cars; used, good cars; and used, bad cars.96
In this schema, all car buyers want a “good” car. This
simplification makes sense where most buyers can agree that a
“good” car is one that is mechanically sound. But there is no
such analogy to crowdfunding, where diverse Digital
Shareholders have a multitude of reasons for investing in a
particular company.
Professionals such as VCs seek to maximize return on
investment (ROI) of about 25% to 30% by investing in a
portfolio of companies and monitoring them closely, expecting
some to totally fail and others to return 20X the initial
investment.97 VCs invest in:
industries that are more competitively forgiving than the market as a
whole. . . . In effect, venture capitalists focus on the middle part of the
classic industry S-curve. They avoid both the early stages, when
technologies are uncertain and market needs are unknown, and the
later stages, when competitive shakeouts and consolidations are
inevitable and growth rates slow dramatically.98

Digital Shareholders seem to operate quite differently.
They often choose to invest in local companies,99 women- or
minority-owned companies,100 and companies that make
96. George A. Akerlof, The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality, Uncertainty and
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. Econ. 488, 489 ( 1970).
97. Bob Zider, How Venture Capital Works, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec.
1998, https://hbr.org/1998/11/how-venture-capital-works.
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., How to Invest Local, LOCAVESTING, http://www.locavesting
.com/how-to-invest-local/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2016) (“There are a growing
number of alternatives for individuals who want to invest locally.”); Invest in
Texas Businesses, NEXTSEED.COM, https://www.nextseed.com (last visited Aug.
13, 2016).
100. Bret Conklin, Three Ways Crowdfunding Empowers Women &
Minority Entrepreneurs, CROWDFUND INSIDER (June 17, 2016), http://www
.crowdfundinsider.com/2016/06/87003-three-ways-crowdfunding-empowers-
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consumer products,101 even though few of these investments
can ever achieve 20X returns. Web sites that facilitate these
local investments (“Portals”) generally do not promise to
“maximize returns,” but rather make more modest claims like
“earn solid returns.”102
The investment goals of Digital Shareholders may not be to
earn 25% ROI over a 10-year term; rather, they may seek to
foster local companies, support an underserved demographic, or
to produce a consumer product they will enjoy owning.
Therefore, equity crowdfunding may not have the severe
information asymmetries of Professor Ibrahim’s concern.103
Digital Shareholders can observe prior to investing whether a
company is operated locally, owned or run by women, or
produces an enticing consumer good. Portals can easily
determine and convey such information. In fact, many state
laws require Portals to confirm that online equity investment
opportunities are in-state companies.104
Returning to the classic Akerlof analogy, it now seems that
equity crowdfunding is more like a market for new cars than
for old ones, at least on the dimensions that are most relevant
to Digital Shareholders’ investment decisions. A new-car buyer
women-minority-entrepreneurs/ (discussing a 2014 report by Crowdfund
Capital Advisors that predicted that crowdfunding would help redfine the
capital disparity that exists for both minorities and women trying to find
investors).
101. Id. (noting that crowdfunding has the ability through broadening the
base of investors to open avenues for raising capital that the venture
community has traditionally not provided for women and minorities); Salvador
Rodriguez, Tech Diversity: New SEC Crowdfunding Rules are a Big Win for
Minority and Women Entrepreneurs, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2015), http://
www.ibtimes.com/tech-diversity-new-sec-crowdfunding-rules-are-big-winminority-women-entrepreneurs-2163390 (noting that crowdfunding has
already proved beneficial for underrepresented groups in the U.K. as more
than half of the businesses that raised funding through Syndicate Room—the
leading U.K. equity crowdfunding platform, had a female founder or lead
investor); see also Will Schroter, Top 10 Business Crowdfunding Campaigns of
All Time, FORBES (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wilschroter/
2014/04/16/top-10-business-crowdfunding-campaigns-of-all-time/
#3a259950203d.
102. NEXTSEED.COM, https://www.nextseed.com (last visited Aug. 13,
2016).
103. Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 651.
104. See, e.g., The Illinois Securities Law of 1953, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/1–5/19 (2016), as amended by the Illinois Intrastate Equity Crowdfunding
Bill, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2.34 et. seq. (stating that if the issuer issues
securities through a registered Internet portal, that portal verifies that the
purchaser is a resident of the state of Illinois).
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can readily determine whether a model is a convertible or a
sedan (even if it is “impossible for a buyer to tell the difference
between a good and a bad [used] car”).105 Likewise, there is no
information asymmetry regarding whether an investment
opportunity is for a local brewery,106 a personal aircraft,107 or a
mission to mars.108 If Digital Shareholders are more concerned
with the nature of the company they fund than with the
probably of making outsized returns, then equity crowdfunding
is really a different market from venture-capital funding, and
the lemons concern (where “good” companies seek VC
investment and “bad” companies seek crowdfunding
investment) is diminished.
CONCLUSION
This Essay suggests that equity crowdfunding could
become an important part of the innovation economy if the
regulatory systems are engineered properly. In prior work, I
have pointed out numerous ways they are mis-engineered.
Here, I hope to have made two new points: First, Internet
crowds are as wise as we engineer the user experience to be. It
follows that if crowds are regulated to be dumb, they will make
dumb investment decisions. Therefore, the argument that we
should protect crowdfunding investors via regulation must be
evaluated through the crowd-science lens: we should only
regulate crowd behavior where doing so clearly improves
information aggregregation and does not cause information
cascades.
Second, Crowdfunding is not merely about making money.
Crowdfunding provides a new model for the economy, emerging
from our new capacity to stream the wisdom of crowds through
Internet Portals to crowd-source investment decisions. This
democratizes access to investment and encourages equity
investments that are not based purely on the venture-capital
105. Akerlof, supra note 96, at 489.
106. See CRAFTFUND.COM, http://craftfund.com (last visited Aug. 13, 2016).
107. XTI Aircraft Exceeds $1 Million in Equity Crowdfunding Investments;
Will Accelerate Development of Trifan 600 Prototype, XTI AIRCRAFT (Apr.
21, 2016), http://www.xtiaircraft.com/2016/04/21/xti-aircraft-exceeds-1-millionequity-crowdfunding-investments-will-accelerate-development-trifan-600prototype/.
108. AlgaStar, CROWDFUNDER, https://www.crowdfunder.com/algastar/
invest (last visited Aug. 13, 2016) (describing crowdfunding project as
“[m]ission to Mars—biotechnology R&D company for producing food, Co2 to
pure oxygen & valuable biochemicals for earth & space utilization”).
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model of return on investment, opening up new possibilities for
funding new catagories of companies and entrepreneurs. It is
folly to evaluate crowdfunding purely with venture-capital
metrics like return on investment. Crowdfunding systems
should be evaluated by their capacity to reveal what people
want and believe and by their ability to capitalize diverse
entrepreneurs and ideas.

